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INTRODUCTION

The notion that workers' compensation benefits are an injured worker's
exclusive remedy against an employer following a work related accident is the
defining principle of workers' compensation law.I These exclusive remedy
. Class of 2001, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada
Las Vegas. The author would like to thank Jeffrey W. Stempel for his guidance and Lew Brandon, Jr., Esq., for
suggesting the topic.
1 See William Bassin, An Analysis of Employer Contributionto Third Parties Under Workers' Compensation Statutes, 30 TORT & INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL 3:843 (1995). E.g.,
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provisions grant an employer who provides workers' compensation benefits to
an employee injured in the course and 2 scope of employment immunity from
other liability for the employee's injury.
The clearest exception to the exclusive remedy provisions is a thirdparty's right to enforce an express contract in which the employer agrees to indemnify the third-party for the very kind of loss that the third-party has been
made to pay the employee. 3 Prior to Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty4 , it was
well established in Nevada that an employer was only liable in a third-party indemnity action when an express indemnity contract existed between an employer and a third-party. 5 The specific question of whether an employer should
indemnify a third-party under high voltage power line statutes was an issue of
first impression in Nevada. Consequently, Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty was
an important decision. Unfortunately, it will have a grave impact on workers'
compensation6 law and well-established principles of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act.
This note will illustrate how the Nevada Supreme Court implicitly expanded Nevada's application of the independent duty doctrine in Nevada
Power Co. v. Haggerty, contrary to fundamental principles in workers' compensation law, by holding the provisions of Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS")
455.200-455.250 apply to an employer whose employee is injured by contact
with an overhead power line, when the employer fails to notify the appropriate
public utility prior to allowing the employee to work in close proximity to high
U.S. Borax & Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 406, 213 Cal. Rptr. 155
(1985); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Montoya, 581 P.2d 1283 (N.M.
1978); Henderson v. State, 715 P.2d 978, cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3282, 91 L.Ed.2d 571
(Idaho 1986). See also Arthur Larson, Larson's workers' Compensation Law § 100.01(1):
Once a workers' compensation act has become applicable either through compulsion or election, it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee or the employee's dependents against the employer and insurance carrier. This is part of the quid pro quo in
which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance,
for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, it is relieved of the prospect of
large damage verdicts. Id. at 100-2-3.
2 See, e.g., NRS § 616A.020(1) (2000) for (the rights and remedies provided in chapters
616A to 616D, inclusive, of NRS, for an employee on account of any injury by accident sustained arising out of and in the course of employment shall be exclusive, except as otherwise
provided in those chapters, of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his personal or
legal representative, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of
such injury); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989); N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §
11 (McKinney 1992); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (West 1995). See also Oliver v.
Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Ill Nev. 1338, 1342, 905 P.2d 168, 171 (1995).
3 See Larson, §121.04(2). See also Porello v. US, 153 F.2d 605 ( nd Cir. 1946), aff'd in part
2
and rev'd in part and remanded sub. nom., American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446
(1947). Only Alabama holds to the contrary in Paul Krebs & Assoc. v. Matthews & Fruits
Constr. Co., 356 So.2d 638 (Ala. 1978).
4 115 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 52 (December 13, 1999). See 989 P.2d 870 (1999).
5 See, e.g., American Federal Savings Bank v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d 1270
(1990). See discussion infra Part II.
6 The Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is compiled in chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, of
NRS
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voltage power lines. Part I will describe the nature of workers' compensation
law, the independent duty doctrine and the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's

exclusive remedy provision.7 Part II will introduce the facts and procedural
background of Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty.8 Part III will explain the Ma-

jority and Dissent's reasoning. 9 Part IV will analyze the Nevada Supreme
Court's holding in Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, particularly the Majority's

failure to define "independent duty," other jurisdictions' analysis of exclusivity
provisions of their own workers' compensation acts, Haggerty's inconsistency
with public policy underlying the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive
0

remedy provision and the Majority's erroneous statutory interpretation.'
I.

BACKGROUND: WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW AND THE NEVADA
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE ACT'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION AND
INDEPENDENT DUTY DOCTRINE

Prior to workers' compensation acts, all "employer liability" legislation accepted the basic common law idea the employer was liable to the employee

only for its own negligence, fault or, at most, the fault of someone for whom it
was generally responsible under the respondeat superior doctrine. 11 The
movement to enact the modem workers' compensation system, which imposed
liability without fault upon the employer, began at the end of the nineteenth

century, when the coincidence of increasing industrial injuries and decreasing
remedies for employees called for radical change. 12 Actual enactment of
workers' compensation schemes began in 1902 when Maryland established a
cooperative accident fund for miners, but courts initially held these acts unconstitutional.

13

As a result, state legislatures were reluctant to pass complete

7 See text and accompanying notes 6-43, infra.
8 See text and accompanying notes 45-48, infra.
9 See text and accompanying notes 49-73, infra.
1oSee text and accompanying notes 74-145, infra.
11See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.05. "The most the 'Employer's Liability' statutes set out
to accomplish was the restoration of the employee to a position no worse than that of a
stranger injured by the negligence of the employer or his servants." p. 2-7. Professor Larson
notes the first such acts can be found at Ga. Laws 1855, p. 155; Iowa Laws 1852, ch. 169,
sec. 7; Kan. Stats. 1874, ch. 93, sec. 1; Wis. Laws 1875, ch. 173; Wyo. Terr. Act 1869. The
effect of this remedial legislation is that the common law defenses of vicarious liability, assumption of risk and contributory negligence were available as defenses to the employer and
the employee was left without a remedy in eighty-three percent of all cases. See LARSON,
supra note 1, at § 2.03.
12See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.07. The modem workers' compensation system made
the employer bear the entire burden of any insurance against that liability.
13See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.07. The Maryland Act (found at Md. Laws 1902, Ch.
139) was held unconstitutional in an unappealed lower court decision, Franklin v. United
Rys. & Elc. Co. of Baltimore, 2 Baltimore City Rep. 304 (1904). Similarly, in 1909, another
miner's compensation act was passed in Montana and suffered the same fate in Cunningham
v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 554 (1911). In 1910, New York
passed the first act with compulsory coverage of certain "hazardous employments." The
Court of Appeals held it unconstitutional in 1911, on the ground that the imposition of liabil-
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and compulsory coverage
workmen's compensation• .acts,,,with,,comprehensive
,,14
As a result
and opted instead for "optional" or "elective" statutory schemes.
of Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 15 New York adopted a constitutional amendment
permitting a compulsory law in 1913 and such a law was passed in the same
year. 16 In 1917, the United States Supreme Court held the New York compulsory law constitutional, 17 and, with fears of constitutional impediments virtu"with a rapidity that probably has
system grew
ally removed, the compensation
•
,,18
By 1920, all but eight states had
no parallels in any comparable field of law."
adopted compensation acts, and in 1963, Hawaii was the last state to adopt a
workers' compensation system. 19
The modem workers' compensation system is recognized as a mutually
Arthur Larson, the
beneficial bargain between employers and employees.
foremost expert on workers' compensation law, described workmen's compensation theory in its idealized form as follows:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the
wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain
form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work connected injuries
which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in
some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to

ity without fault upon the employer was a taking of property without due process of law. See
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). As to initial arguments regarding the constitutionality of workman's compensation laws, see Boyd, Compensationfor
Injuries to Workmen, pp. 153-204 (1913).
14 See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.07. Under these early workmen's compensation laws,
employers could choose whether or not they would be bound by the compensation plan, with
the alternative of being subject to common-law action without benefit of the common-law
defenses (vicarious liability, assumption of risk and contributory negligence). Similarly, a
number of states limited their coverage to "hazardous" employments because of doubt as to
the extent of the police power. Id. at p. 2-14. There remain eight states with this limitation:
Maryland, New Mexico, Wyoming, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Kansas and Montana.
15 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). In 1910, New York passed a workers' compensation
act with compulsory coverage of certain "hazardous employments." Larson, § 2.07, p. 2-14;
Laws of 1910, ch. 674. Ives is a pinnacle case in which the New York Court of Appeals held
this act unconstitutional on the ground that "the imposition of liability without fault upon the
employer was a taking of property without due process of law under the state and federal
Id.
constitution."
16
N.Y.CONST. Art. I, § 18.
17See New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S.188 (1917). Also in 1917, the Supreme
Court held an elective type workmen's compensation law as passed in Iowa and the Washington exclusive-state-fund-type law constitutional. See Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U.S. 210
(1917) and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
18See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.07, p. 2-15.
19See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.08.
20

See Bassin, supra note 1, at 843. See, e.g., NRS 616A.010(1) which provides "The provi-

sions of chapters 616A to 617 [the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act], inclusive, of NRS must
be interpreted and construed to ensure the quick and efficient payment of compensation to
injured and disabled employees at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject to the
provisions of those chapters."
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the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.2 '
Though social in philosophy, the modem American workers' compensation

system is mainly
a private matter between employees, insurance carriers and
22
employers.
In sum, employees injured in the course and scope of their employment trade their right to pursue possible negligence actions against employers in exchange for guaranteed payment regardless of fault. 23 A compensation system, unlike tort recovery, does not pretend to restore to the injured
worker what he has lost; it gives the worker a sum, which added to his remain-

ing earning ability, if any, will presumably enable him to exist without being a
burden to others or to society.
The right to compensation depends on one
simple test: Was there a work-related injury?2 5 Negligence, and, for the most
part fault, are not at issue and cannot affect the result.
Conversely, the employer pays workers' compensation benefits regardless of fault in exchange for

21
22

See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 1.03(2).
See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 3.10. See, e.g., NRS 616C.010, which provides that an

employee must "forthwith" provide notice of an injury suffered in the course and scope of
employment to the employer, the employer may request the injured employee to seek medical treatment, the treating physician shall report the character and nature of the injury to the
employer, and the insurer must authorize further medical treatment.
23 Bassin, supra note 1, at 843. See, e.g., NRS 616A.010(3) which provides "The
provisions
of chapters 616A to 617, inclusive, of [NRS] are based on a renunciation of the rights and
defenses of employers and employees recognized at common law." See also NRS 616A.
020(2) which provides "The terms, conditions and provisions of chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, of NRS, for the payment of compensation and the amount thereof for injuries sustained or death resulting from said injuries shall be conclusive, compulsory and obligatory;"
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3602(a) (West 1989). Note that CAL. LABOR CODE § 3602(b) allows an
injured employee to bring an action in certain specific enumerated circumstances, e.g., where
the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a willful physical assault by the emloyer.
See LARSON, supra note 1,at § 1.03(5), p. 1-10. Professor Larson further notes that workers compensation, unlike the tort compensation system, only compensates injuries which either actually or presumptively produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning
power. LARSON at § 1.03(4), p. 1 -9 . See, e.g., NRS 616C.490(6), which sets forth a specific
schedule of the percentage of a worker's salary to which he/she would be entitled in the
event of a permanent partial disability. The percentages are incremental based on the severity of the disability. See also NRS 616C.440, which provides that employees who suffer a
permanent total disability in the course and scope of their employment are entitled to sixtysix and two-thirds percent of their average monthly wage.
25 See LARSON, supra note 1, at §1.03(2), 1-5. NRS 616C.150 requires an injured
employee
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's injury arose out of and
in the course of employment.
26 See LARSON, supra note 1,at § 1.03(1); "Let the employer's conduct be flawless
in its perfection, and let the employee's be abysmal in its clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude; if the
accident arises out of and in the course of the employment, the employee receives an award.
Reverse the positions, with a careless and stupid employer and a wholly innocent employee
and the same award issues." Id. See, e.g., NRS 616A.020(2), supra note 2; CAL. LABOR
CODE § 3600 (West 1989).
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• 27
immunity from further employee action.
For example, in Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, a mining company
hired a welder employed by an independent contractor to work on a mill. After
he was injured on the job, the welder brought a negligence action against the
mining company and the mining company claimed statutory immunity on
grounds it was the welder's statutory employer. The district court granted
summary judgment for the minin company and the welder appealed. The
Court interpreted NRS 616B.612 2-and the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act to
mean that "under Nevada law, every employer, within the provisions of [NRS]
3
chapter 616, must 'provide and secure' compensation for injured employees."
In return for providing such compensation, employers enjoy the benefit of the
exclusive remedy and immunity provisions. . . "These provisions grant an employer... immunity from other liability for recovery of damages or other com31
pensation for the personal injury of an employee arising out of employment."
The Court remanded the case for a trial on its merits and held: "(1) statutory
immunity under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is not limited to licensed
contractors; (2) the test used to determine whether the employer of an independent contractor is a "statutory employer" entitled to immunity is whether
the independent contractor's activity is normally carried on through employees
rather than independent contractors; and (3) the mining company and independent contractor hired to modify its mill were not in the "same 3trade,"
and
2
thus the mining company was not the welder's statutory employer."

Similarly, in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 33 employees of a
chemical plant brought a personal injury action against a manufacturer of an
electric cart and a chemical plant as a result of an explosion caused when a
spark from the cart ignited benzene gas which accumulated from leaky pipes.
The Court held employers who accept the Industrial Insurance Act and secure
compensation for employee's injuries arising
out of and in the course of em34
ployment are relieved from other liability.
Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of compensation law
is the question whether a third-party in an action by an employee can get con-

27 Bassin, supra note 1, at 843. See, e.g., NRS 616A.020(1), supra note 2, which provides
"The rights and remedies provided in chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, of NRS for an employee on account of an injury by accident sustained arising out of and in the course of employment shall be exclusive, except as otherwise provided in those chapters, of all other
rights and remedies of the employee, his personal or legal representative, dependents or next
of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury."
28 111 Nev. 1338, 905 P.2d 168 (1995),
29 Previously NRS 616.270.
30 Oliver at 1342.
31id.
32 111 Nev. 1338, 1339, 905 P.2d 168, (1995)(per curium).
"
34 93 Nev. 158, 561 P.2d 450 (1977).
Id.at 164.
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tribution or indemnity from a negligent employer. 35 The classical compensation doctrine is that the employer is relieved of all tort liability to its own employee by the exclusive remedy clause of the compensation act and cannot be
indemnity. 36
liable to the third-party for contribution or for non-contractual
However, if the third-party and employer stand in a special legal relationship
that carries with it the employer's obligation to indemnify the third-party, this
relational right of indemnity may be enforced without offending the exclusive
. 38 is clear when the obligaremedy clause.
• 37. Specifically, the right to indemnity
Professor Larson has detion springs from a separate contractual relation.
scribed the dilemma and general rule regarding implied contractual agreements
as follows:
In summary, when the relation between the parties involves no contract or
special relation capable of carrying with it an implied obligation to indemnify,
the basic exclusiveness rule generally cannot be defeated by dressing the remedy itself in contractual clothes, such as indemnity, since what governs is not
35 See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 121.01(1). Professor Larson notes: "This sentence, first
published in 1953, has been frequently quoted as a preamble to opinions or articles on this
question. See, e.g., opinion of Wisden, J., in General Electric Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co.,
396 F.2d 89 ( 5 th Cir. 1968), opinion of Pettine, J., in Newport Air Park Inc. v. U.S., 293
F.Supp. 809, 816 (D.R.I. 1968), opinion of Hyde, J., in McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 at 794 (Mo. 1959) and comment by Robert
M. Bonnin, 22 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 236 (1958). The statement is as true as it ever was." p. 1213. It is also important to note the difference between contribution and indemnity. The right
of contribution is based either upon contribution-between-tortfeasor statutes or upon common law or admirality contribution, where available and applicable. The right of indemnity
is based upon an independent duty or obligation owed by the employer to the third party,
either as the result of express contract or as the result of an implication raised by law. p.
121-12.
36
See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 121.01(3), p. 121-7. See also § 121.02 which notes the
great majority of jurisdictions have held an employer cannot be sued or joined as a joint
tortfeasor in a third party claim even if its negligence contributed to the employee's injury.
The ground is simple, the employer is not jointly liable to the employee in tort; therefore, he
cannot be a joint tortfeasor. The liability that rests upon the employer is an absolute liability
irrespective of negligence, and this is the only kind of liability that can devolve upon him
whether he is negligent or not. The claim of the employee against the employer is solely for
statutory benefits; his claim against the third person is for damages. The two are different in
t
kind and cannot result in a common liability. See Rizzuto v. Joy Mfg. Co., 834 F.2d 7 (1
n
Mountain
v.
White
Williams
1975),
(
d
Cir.
F.2d
949
Cir. 1987), Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514
2
Constr. Co., 749 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1988), Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co., 457 A.2d 763 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1983), Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43 (Maine 1969), Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983), Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308 (1978), Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority,
106 A.2d 752 (N.J. 1954), Cacchillo v. H.Leach Mach. Co., 305 A.2d 541 (R.I. 1973).
37 See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 121.05(1). See, e.g., Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
Eller Outdoor Advertising Co., 635 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Tucson Elec. v.
Swengel-Robbins Constr., 153 Ariz. 486, 737 P.2d 1385 (Ct. App. 1987); Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Constr. Co. Inc., 270 Ga. 464, 511 S.E.2d 160 (1999). See discussion infra Part V.A.
38 See generally LARSON, supra note 1, at § 121.04(2). E.g., American Federal Savings Bank
v. Washoe, 106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d 1270 (1990).

NEVADA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:289

the delictual or contractual form of the remedy but the question: is the claim
"on account of' the injury, or on account of a separate obligation running from
39
the employer to the third-party?

Prior to Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized and validated the fundamental legal doctrine that an employer is only liable in a third-party indemnity action when an express contract exists between
an employer and a third-party.
In American Federal Savings v. Washoe,4 ° Washoe County contracted to
lease the Union Federal Building from First Federal. One provision of the lease
agreement required Washoe County to indemnify First Federal "for any loss
'4
injury, death or damage to persons allowed to use or occupy the premises. ,
Washoe County employees injured themselves while in the course and scope of
their employment, and though they were entitled to workers' compensation
benefits from Washoe County, sued First Federal as owner of the building.
One of the injured employees recovered damages against First Federal. As a
result, Washoe County brought a declaratory action against First Federal, seeking a declaration of Washoe County's obligations under the lease agreement.
First Federal then counterclaimed seeking indemnification and contribution
against Washoe County for damages it paid in the first case. The Nevada Supreme Court recognized a common law tort action against a third-party may be
an appealing alternative to an injured employee if that third-party is concurrently or exclusively responsible for the employee's, injuries
• and the employee
42
does not feel totally compensated by workers' compensation benefits.
However, where the third-party, in an effort to defend against an adverse monetary
judgment, seeks indemnity back from an employee's employer pursuant to an
implied or express contract agreement, the employer may turn to the Nevada
Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provisions for a defense. 4 3 The
Court reasoned "employers, and co-employees are insulated by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's provisions absent an independent duty owed to a thirdparty.. .not only from liability to employees, but also from liability by way of
indemnity to a third-party."
Additionally, the Court held that if an indemnity
agreement enlarges the liability imposed by the Nevada Industrial Insurance
Act as between an employer and employee, the indemnity agreement is not
based upon an independent duty between the employer and a third-party and is,

39See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 121.08(4).
40

106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d 1270 (1990).

41Id. at 870, 1271.
42

See Am. Fed. Sav., 106 Nev. at 872, 802 P.2d at 1273.

43id.

44Id. at 106 Nev. at 873, 802 P.2d at 1273. The Court's decision is consistent with Nevada

precedent. For example, in Kellen v. District Court, 98 Nev. 133 (1982), the Court held that
absent an independent duty owed to a third party, employers, and co-employees, are insulated by the provisions of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, not only from liability to employees, but also from liability by way of indemnity to a third-party. Id. at 134.
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therefore, void under NRS 616.265. 45 However, implied indemnity general 6
cannot create an independent duty between an employer and a third-party.
Thus, an express indemnity contract is all that
remains to establish the inde47
pendent duty recognized in OutboardMarine.
The American Federal Savings holding is consistent with basic principles
underlying workers' compensation law. In that regard, the clearest exception to
the exclusive liability clause is the third-party's right to enforce an express contract in which the employer agrees to indemnify a third-party for the very kind
of loss the third-party paid.
Prior to American Federal Savings, the employer's immunity doctrine was so valued in Nevada that even express indemnity contracts were not allowed as evidenced by the Ninth Circuit in Aetna Cas.
& Surety Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co.49 In summary, although the fundamental
notion of freedom of contract outweighs certain policies behind workers' compensation law, 50 courts interpreting Nevada law and commentators on workers'
compensation law revere the exclusive remedy provisions and, prior to Nevada
Power Co. v. Haggerty, agreed the policy behind the exclusive remedy statutes
in workers' compensation law overrode the notion of implied indemnity
agreements between employers and third-parties.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF NEVADA POWER CO. v.
HAGGERTY

At the center of Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty was an incident involving
45Am. Fed. Sav., 106 Nev. at 877, 802 P.2d at 1276. NRS 616.265 has been recodified and

its provisions are now in NRS 616B.609 which provides: (1)(a) A contract of employment,
insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any other device, does not modify, change or waive
any liability created by chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, of [NRS]; (b) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any other device, having for its purpose the
waiver or modification of the terms or liability created by chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive,
of [NRS] is void.
46 Am. Fed. Sav., 106 Nev. at 873, 802 P.2d at 1275.
47Id.

48See LARSON, supra note 1, at 121.04(2). See, e.g., Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 713 F.Supp 1350 (D. Idaho 1989); United Cable Television of
Jeffco, Inc. v. Montgomery LC, Inc., 942 P.2d 1230 (Colo. 1997); Freund v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3864 (West 1989) which provides
"if an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the employer, or both
jointly against the third person results in judgment against such third person, or settlement by
such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person
harmless on such judgment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed
prior to the injury. h
4'684 F.2d 1267 (9" Cir. 1982). Aetna, the insurer for a property owner, settled two wrongful death actions which arose from the deaths of two of Comstock's employee's on the
owner's property. Aetna then brought the present action against Comstock to recover on an
express indemnity contract between Comstock and the property owner. The Ninth Circuit
held an express indemnity contract is void under NRS 616.265.
50Bassin, supra note 1, at 845, noting the fundamental principle parties should be held to the
agreements they sign.
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Raymond Haggerty, a maintenance engineer at the Horseshoe Hotel & Casino.
On July 12, 1996, Haggerty entered a room in the Horseshoe's basement which
contained high voltage equipment owned by Nevada Power Company. 5 1 Haggerty went into a vault and noticed a dirty vent located next to an electrical bus
bar that ran along the top of high voltage transformers. 52 As he began to clean
the debris from a wall near an intake grill ventilation system, his right shoulder
came into contact with an exposed electrically charged copper wire resulting in
a hi§h voltage electric shock causing Haggerty to suffer various personal injuries.
Haggerty applied for and received workers' compensation benefits. 54 Subsequently, he returned to work at the Horseshoe. Pursuant to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act and, more specifically, NRS 616B.612, Haggerty could not
pursue litigation against the Horseshoe for negligence or any other cause surrounding the accident. Specifically, NRS 616B.612 grants immunity to an employer who has provided workers' compensation coverage to an injured
55
worker.
Haggerty instead sued the Nevada Power Company for negligence. 56 Nevada Power Company filed a third-party complaint against the Horseshoe alleging negligence, indemnification, contribution and statutory indemnification under NRS 455.240.
The Horseshoe filed a motion to dismiss Nevada Power
5' 989 P.2d at 872.
52 989 P.2d at 872.

53 Id.
14 989 P.2d at 873.

55 Relevant sections of the statute provide:
(1)

Every employer within the provisions of chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or 617 of [NRS]
[the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act), and those employers who shall accept the terms of
those chapters and be governed by their provisions, as in those chapters provided, shall
provide and secure compensation according to the terms, conditions and provisions of those
chapters for any and all personal injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of
and in the course of employment... (4) In such cases the employer shall be relieved from
liability for the recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury, unless
by terms of chapters 616A to 616D, of [NRS] otherwise provided.
56 989 P.2d at 873.

57 Relevant sections of the Nevada High Voltage Overhead Power Line Act read as follows:
NRS 455.230. Conducting of activities near line; Authorization; powers and duties of
public utility; payment of expenses for preventative measures.
1. A person may perform an act or operate equipment in closer proximity to an overhead power line carrying high voltage than authorized by [NRS] 455.220 if, before performing the work:
(a)Notice of the work to be performed is provided to the public utility operating the
overhead line carrying high voltage; and
(b)The public utility operating the overhead line carrying high voltage consents to the
performance of the work.
2. If the work can be performed with reasonable safety, the public utility shall promptly
consent to the performance of the work. As a condition of consent, the public utility may:
(a) Reasonably limit the time, place and manner of the work to preserve public safety.
(b)Place temporary mechanical barriers to separate and present contact between material, equipment or persons and the overhead line carrying high voltage.
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Company's third-party complaint. At the hearing, the Horseshoe argued it was

immune from further liability under NRS 616B.612 because it paid full workers' compensation coverage to Haggerty. The district court granted the motion
to dismiss on August 28, 1997, and Nevada Power appealed.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the third-party complaint. The Court held that overhead power line

statutes create an independent duty to indemnify in favor of a utility company
and constitute an exception
.58 to the employer immunity provisions of the workers' compensation laws.

Additionally, the Court held the electrical equip-

injuries did not fall within the definition of an
ment which caused Haggerty's
59
overhead power line.

III.THE REASONING IN NEVADA POWER Co.

A.

v.

HAGGERTY

The Majority's Reasoning
1.

The Independent Duty Doctrine

The Majority held that, as a general rule, an employer who provides compensation to an injured employee under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is
Likewise, "absent an exinsulated from further liability to that employee.
duty
between the employer
an
independent
or
agreement
press indemnification
and the third-party, an employer will not be liable to a third-party for indemni(c) Temporarily disconnect power to the overhead line, ground the overhead line or relocate the overhead line.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the person responsible for performing the work in the vicinity of the overhead line carrying high voltage shall pay any actual
expenses incurred by the public utility in carrying out the preventative measures.
NRS 455.240. Liability for violation causing contact with line.
If an act constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter causes contact with an
overhead line carrying high voltage, each person who committed the violation or caused another person to commit the violation shall pay the public utility operating the overhead line
carrying high voltage for:
1. All damages to property of the public utility.
2. All reasonable costs and expenses incurred by the public utility as a result of the
contact; and
3. The costs and expenses incurred by the public utility as a result of the contact for
damages to third persons.
Each person who committed a violation causing the contact or who caused another person to commit a violation causing the contact is jointly and severally liable for the payment
required by this section.
58 989 P.2d at 877.
9Id. at 879. NRS 455.200(2) defines an "overhead line" as a bare or insulated electrical
conductor installed above ground.
60 See, e.g., Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 1342, 905 P.2d 168, 171
(1995).
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fication arising out of an injury to an employee." 6 1 Nonetheless, the Court
concluded overhead power line statutes do create an independent duty to indemnify in favor of a utility and therefore constitute an exception to Nevada
workers' compensation law's employer immunity provisions.
The Court
noted four states that have addressed this issue concluded overhead power line
statutes allow a power company to seek indemnification from an employer, despite the employer's general immunity under workers' compensation law. Spe63
cifically, the Court cited cases from Texas, Arizona, Oklahoma and Georgia.
The only
case the Court cited contrary to its holding is Rodriguez v. Nurseris,
64
Inc.

The Court briefly mentioned the legislative history of overhead power line
statutes and noted there is none to support either position of workers' compensation issues in the hearings' records. However, by utilizing rules of statutory
construction, the Majority concluded NRS 455.240 constitutes an exception to
the employer immunity provision and such an interpretation promotes the purpose of the overhead power line statutes with minimal interference and with the
general purpose of the workers' compensation laws.6 6 The Court reasoned
61989 P.2d at 874. See, e.g., American Federal Savings v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 869,

877-78, 802 P.2d 1270, 1275 (1990); Outboard Marine Co. v. Shupbach, 93 Nev. 158, 16465, 561 P.2d 450, 454 (1977); LARSON, supra note 1, at § 76.40 at 14-819 & § 76.50 at 14857 (1998).
62989 P.2d at 877.
63 989 P.2d. at 875-76. The Court cites Olson v. Central Power and Light Co., 803 S.W.2d

808, 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991; Houston Lighting, Etc. v. Eller Outdoor Adv., 635 S.W.2d
133,135 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Tucson Elec. v. Dooley-Jones and Assoc., 746 P.2d 510
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Tucson Elec. v. Swengel-Robbins Const., 737 P.2d 1385 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987); Travelers Insurance Co. v. L.V. French Truck Service, 770 P.2d 551 (Okla.
1988); Flint Electric Membership v. Ed Smith Construction, 511 S.E.2d 160 (1999). See
discussion infra Part V.A.
64 815 P.2d 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). In Rodriguez, the Colorado court determined that if
the Colorado legislature had intended the overhead power line statutes to operate as an exception to the exclusivity provision of workers' compensation, "it would have done so
clearly," and held an employer is immune from suit by the power company. See discussion
infra Part V.A.
65 989 P.2d at 876.

66 989 P.2d at 877. Specifically, the Majority notes "It is an accepted rule of statutory con-

struction that a provision which specifically applied to a given situation will take precedence
over one that applied only generally;" see, e.g., Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Rottman, 95 Nev. 654,
656, 601 P.2d 56, 57-58 (1979) citing W.R. Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, 172 P.2d 158
(1946); "When the legislature enacts a statute, this Court presumes that it does so 'with full
knowledge of existing statutes relating to the same subject';" see, e.g., City of Boulder v.
General Sales Drivers, 101 Nev. 117, 118-19, 604 P.2d 498, 500 (1985);
"...whenever possible, a court will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules or
statutes;" see e.g., Bowyer v. Taack, 107 Nev. 625, 627, 817 P.2d 1176, 1177 (1991); City
Council of Reno v. Reno Newspaper, 105 Nev. 886, 892, 784 P.2d 974, 978 (1989); "In addition, statutory interpretation should avoid absurd or unreasonable results;" see, e.g., General Motors v. Jackson, Ill Nev. 1026, 1029, 900 P.2d 345, 348 (1995); Las Vegas Sun v.
District Court, 104 Nev. 500, 511, 761 P.2d 849, 851 (1988); Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. 729,
733, 542 P.2d 440, 443 (1975).

See also NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
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overhead power line statutes were specifically enacted to protect all persons
from the hazards associated with working in close proximity to high voltage
overhead power lines. 67 The Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, enacted prior to
the overhead power line statutes, only provides a general method for workers to
be compensated for work-related injuries. 68 In support of its analysis, the
Court cites Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Roltman,69 which established the general rule
of statutory construction: "a provision which specifically applies to a given
situation will take precedence over one that applies only generally." 70 The
Court also relies upon City of Boulder v. General Sales Drive,7 1 which noted
when the legislature enacts a statute, the court presumes it does so "with full
knowledge of existing statutes relating to the same subject." 72 With this guidance, the Majority concluded NRS 455.240 should take precedence over NRS
616B.612. 73 Moreover, the Court looked to the public policy behind the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision and the overhead
power line statutes and added:
The people who are most likely to be injured around an overhead power line
are individuals who are working in the scope of their employment. If employers cannot be sued in indemnification pursuant to NRS 455.240(3) for injuries
sustained by their employees, an important incentive for compliance involving
the major beneficiaries of the act would be eliminated. Thus, this interpretation would yield an unreasonable result. Finding that NRS 455.240 constitutes an exception to the employer immunity provision fully promotes the purpose of the overhead power lines statutes with minimal interference with the
general purpose of the workers' compensation laws. This is a more harmonious resolution of the conflict between the two statutes than gutting the power
line statute in favor of workers' compensation laws.74
2.

Definition of Overhead Power Lines

NRS 455.200(2) provides: "'Overhead' line means a bare or insulated
electrical conductor installed above ground." Subsequent to the Haggerty
Court's independent duty analysis, the Nevada Supreme Court applied rules of
statutory construction to analyze the meaning of the term overhead lines and
§ 45.05 at 31 (6 th ed. 2000) which provides "In construing the meaning of a
statute the courts must consider the history of the subject matter involved, the end to be atCONSTRUCTION

tained, the mischief to be remedied and the purpose to be accomplished. It has also been
stated to show that all rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used and that lanuage must be construed in the light of the intended purpose."
989 P.2d at 876.
68 Id. at 877.
69 95 Nev. 654, 608 P.2d 56 (1979).
70 95 Nev. at 656, 608 P.2d at 57-8.
71 101 Nev. 117, 694 P.2d 498 (1985).
72 101 Nev. at 118-19, 694 P.2d at 500.
71 989 P.2d 877.
14 989 P.2d at 877.
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noted the most consistent definition was outdoor, electrical equipment.7 5 The
Court reasoned interpreting the statute any other way would require employees
to contact Nevada Power any time they entered the electrical vault room and
Nevada Power could charge a fee each time to supervise the work. 76 In that
regard, the Majority found defining "overhead power lines" any other way than
to mean outdoor, electrical equipment would actually undermine workers'
safety, because Nevada Power would have no incentive to maintain safety
measures to protect people from accidental contact because of the fee provision. 77 Specifically, the Majority determined the statutory intent is better
served by not imposing the provisions of the overhead7 power line laws to high
voltage electrical equipment located within a building.
B.

The Dissent'sReasoning

The dissent noted important flaws in the Majority's reasoning. Initially
the dissent concluded the majority never should have decided that overhead
power line statutes create an independent duty to indemnify because the Majority held the circumstances ' of
the case did not bring it within the "parameters of
79
the overhead line statutes."
Most important, the dissent stated the electrical equipment which caused
Haggerty's injuries does fit within the definitions of overhead power lines. The
dissent reasoned the language of NRS 455.200(2)80 does not constrain the interpretation to mean the line must be in open air, outside or above sea level.
Therefore, the best interpretation of "above ground" is not buried. 8 1 The dis7 989 P.2d at 878. Once again, the Majority enumerates several specific rules of statutory
construction: "When the language of a statute if plain and unambiguous, a court should give
that language its ordinary meaning and not go beyond it;" see e.g., City Council of Reno v.
Reno Newspapers, 105 Nev. 886, 891, 784 P.2d 974, 977 (1989); "When a statute is ambiguous, it should be construed 'in line with what reason and public policy would indicate
the legislature intended';" see, e.g., Robert E.v. Justice Court. 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d
957, 959 (1983) quoting Cannon v. Taylor, 87 Nev. 285, 288, 486 P.2d 493, 495 (1971);
"Several factors can be used to determine legislative intent. The title of a statute can be considered;" see, e.g., A Minor v. Clark Co. Juvenile Ct. Serve., 87 Nev. 544, 548, 490 P.2d
1248, 1250 (1971); "Other words or phrases used in the statute or separate subsections of the
statute can be reviewed to determine the meaning and purpose of the statute;" see, e.g., Bd.
Of County Comm'rs v. CMC of Nevada, 99 Nev. 739, 744, 670 P.2d 102, 105 (1983); "Finally, the subject matter of the statute and policy to be effectuated can be used in statutory
construction;" see, e.g., Welfare Div. V. Washoe Co. Welfare Dep't, 88 Nev. 635, 503 P.2d
457 (1972). The Majority reasoned that the statute in question, NRS 455.200-NRS 455.250,
is entitled "Overhead Lines Carrying High Voltage" and language of the statute covers outdoor, not indoor electrical equipment. Id. at 878-79.
76 989 P.2d at 879.
771id.

78Id.

79989 P.2d at 880.
80 NRS 455.200(2) defines overhead power lines as bare or insulated electrical conductors
installed above ground, supra note 47.
"' 989 P.2d at 880.

Spring 2001 ]

NEVADA POWER V HAGGERTY

sent recognized a liberal interpretation of the overhead power line statutes as
the best interpretation to promote workers' safety. 82 In that regard, the dissent
reasoned neither the legislature or statute distinguish between indoor and outdoor power lines, and the danger to workers is not affected whether the line is
indoors or outdoors.83 Specifically, the purpose of the law, to promote worker
safety, is best accomplished "if the statutes were interpreted to apply to all exposed power lines, without regard to84whether they are located outside or inside,
on a wooden pole or in a basement."
Finally, the dissent noted the majority's decision was partly based on
concerns that a ruling for Nevada Power Company would mean Nevada Power
Company could charge repeated supervisory fees to an employer such as the
Horseshoe Club whenever an employee works near the electrical room. 85 The
dissent found this reasoning
flawed because nothing in the record existed to
•86
assertion.
this
support

82

Id.

The dissent compared the high voltage power line statute to mining and real estate

statutes that had been liberally interpreted: "This court has consistently determined that a
statute with a protective purpose should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the intended protection." Id. at 881. In Tobin v. Gartiez, 44 Nev. 179, 191 P. 1063 (1920), the
Court interpreted a statute which prohibited unauthorized grazing on the land of a person
with legal title and determined that "legal title" included a lessee because the statute was enacted to protect those with a right to the exclusive occupation of the land. Id. at 186-187,
191 P. at 1065. In Ex Parte Douglass, 53 Nev. 188, 295 P. 447 (1931), the Court held that a
statute which required mine shafts to be equipped with a "safety cage, safety crosshead or
safety skip" required a safety cage and wither a safety crosshead or safety skip, rather than
reading the statute with three alternative, because the statute was enacted to promote the
safety of miners as they traveled up and down the mine shafts. Id. at 191-92, 295 P. at 448
(quoting Section 10480, N.C.L. as amended (1913 Nev. Stat. ch. 267, § 1, at 422-23)). In
Brill v. State Real Estate Division, 95 Nev. 917, 604 P.2d 113 (1979), the issue was whether
a twenty-five dollar fee charged by the defendant for access to an index of available homes
for sale and rent was an "advance fee," thus mandating that the defendant obtain a real estate
license. This court determined that the fee was in fact an "advance fee," because the purpose
of the real estate license was to protect the public from unqualified persons. Id. at 919-20,
604 P.2d at 114. Lastly, in Colelo v. Administrator; Real Estate Div., 100 Nev. 344, 683
P.2d 15 (1984), the appellants received a judgment against a real estate licensee on the basis
of fraud, misrepresentation and embezzlement. After appellants unsuccessfully attempted to
collect from the licensee, they obtained $10,000.00 from the Real Estate Education, Research and Recovery Fund ("Fund") pursuant to Nevada law. The Court held that appellants
were only required to assign $10,000.00 of their judgment to the Fund despite statutory language that "the judgment creditor shall assign all his right, title and interest in the judgment"
because the statute was intended to protect judgment creditors without requiring them to forsake their entire judgment to collect a portion. Id. at 346 n.2 and 347-48, 683 P.2d at 16 n. 2
and 16-17. The dissent argued the high voltage power line statute is entitled to the same liberal interpretation as the Court construed these cases. 989 P.2d at 881.
83 989 P.2d 881.
84989 P.2d at 881.
85
id.
86 id.
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IV.ANALYSIS

The Majority in Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty implicitly expanded the
independent duty doctrine and this implication will have far reaching ramifications in the State of Nevada. The Majority based its decision upon rules of
statutory construction and courts in other states with similar holdings. However, the Majority fails to define and/or explain the independent duty between
Horseshoe and Nevada Power Co. The holding in this case does not harmonize
the two statutory schemes but instead minimizes, and perhaps nullifies, important policies behind Nevada workers' compensation law.
A.

The Majority did not define "independentduty."

The majority correctly notes that an employer who provides compensation
to an injured employee under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is insulated
from further liability to that employee. 87 The Court further recognizes the conflict between the plain meaning of the overhead power line statutes and the
88
laws governing employer immunity under workers' compensation statutes.
Ironically, the Court still held Nevada's overhead power line statutes should be
an exception to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision. 89 The Court based its decision on only four states which have similarly
decided overhead power line statutes constitute
an exception to workers' com9
pensation acts' exclusive remedy provision. 0
In Houston Lighting, Etc., v. Eller Outdoor Adv.,
an electric utility
company sought indemnity against an outdoor advertising company seeking
recovery of the amount of a settlement it paid to an employee's family when
the employee was electrocuted in the course and scope of his employment. The
court held a party entitled to indemnification for damages to an injured employee, under the Public Utilities Act, would be entitled to recover from an employer covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. 92 In so holding, the court
87 The

Majority cites Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 1342, 905 P.2d

168, 171 (1995). See also NRS 616.270(3).

88 989 P.2d at 876.
89

Id. at 877.

90

Id. at 875.

91635 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App. 1982).

The Court also cited Olson v. Central Power and Light

Co., 803 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App. 1991) in which an employee of Olson sued Central Power
when he sustained personal injuries as a result of coming into contact with an electrical
overhead power line owned by Central Power and Light Co. Central Power then sought indemnity from Olson. The Texas court noted the issue of the relationship between the Texas
Public Utilities and the Workers Compensation Act was correctly addressed in Houston
Lighting Co. 803 S.W.2d at 812. In that regard, the Public Utilities Act, being a later and
more specific statute, is controlling. Id. The court further noted none of the cases appellant
submitted provide authority for applying the express negligence rule regarding a contractual
indemnity agreement between two parties to statutory indemnity imposed by the Legislature.
Id.
92 635 S.W.2d at 133.
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reasoned the Public Utilities Act was enacted subsequent to the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision and that the later, more specific Public Utilities Act
, should
• be given
93 controlling effect over the older, more

general Workers' Compensation Act. The Texas court noted only this construction permitted the two statutes to be given a harmonious interpretation
most consistent with legislative intent to protect workers and assure employers
will follow minimum statutory
requirements while performing work near haz94
lines.
voltage
high
ardous
Although the Nevada Supreme Court in Haggerty cites Houston Lighting, Etc., Houston Lighting is clearly distinguishable. Initially, in Houston
Lighting, the employee was working on a billboard at the time of his death and
was therefore electrocuted by overhead power lines. In Haggerty, the Nevada
Supreme Court ultimately held the overhead power line statutes were inapplicable because the employee was shocked by power lines in a basement. The
Houston Lighting court reasoned its holding was appropriate because it was
consistent with legislative intent and with the legislature's goal of protecting
workers' safety. This reasoning is inconsequential in Nevada. Legislative history on the relationship between the Nevada High Voltage Safety Act and the
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision is non-existent
and the High Voltage Safety Act already has a civil remedy provision as an incentive for employers to adhere to the regulations and to promote workers'
safety.95 Additionally, Texas and Nevada indemnification law differed greatly
prior to Houston Lighting and Haggerty. The court in Houston noted "Indemnity suits have been allowed in Texas, but only in those instances where the
employer and the third-party have a contractual or implied contractual agreement providing for indemnification, as provided by the Workers' Compensation Statute." 9 It should not be forgotten that prior to American FederalSav9'Id. at 135.
94Id.
95The Majority notes there is no mention of workers' compensation issues in the record of

the hearings and, therefore, the legislative history cannot resolve whether the legislature intended the statutes to operate as an exception to workers' compensation immunity provisions. 989 P.2d at 877.
NRS 455.250 provides:
Civil penalty: Action for enforcement; amount; disposition of proceeds; judicial review.
1. An action for the enforcement of a civil penalty pursuant to this section may be
brought before the public service commission of Nevada by the attorney general, a district
attorney, a city attorney or legal counsel for the public service commission of Nevada.
2. Any person who violated a provision of [NRS] 455.200 to 455.240, inclusive, is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 per day for each violation.
3. The amount of any civil penalty imposed pursuant to this section and the propriety of
any settlement or compromise concerning a penalty must be determined by the public service commission of Nevada upon receipt of a complaint by the attorney general, an employee of the public service commission of Nevada who is engaged in regulatory operations,
a district attorney or a city attorney.
4. In determining the amount of the penalty or the amount agreed upon in a settlement
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97
ings & Loan, Nevada did not allow even express indemnity agreements.
Texas had already defined an implied contractual relationship between the recipient of worker's compensation benefits and a negligent employer.98 Specifically, Texas allowed indemnity to arise implicitly from relationships rather
than solely from an express contract as in Nevada. Although Haggerty is the
first case in Nevada to allow indemnity absent an express contract, the Court
does not define an implied contractual agreement between Nevada Power
Company and the Horseshoe Club but instead simply lists cases and then bases
its decision on statutory interpretation.
In Tucson Elec. v. Swengel-Robbins Const.,99 the Tucson Electric Company sought indemnity from a construction company arising from a claim
brought by the widow of an employee who died in the course and scope of his
employment. The court held the indemnity statute does not violate the workers' compensation statute's exclusive remedy provisions. 1° ° The court reasoned "the statute limits the employee's options regarding employer liability
based on a legal relationship with a third-party and noted the relationship is created by the statute establishing the distance requirements for equipment and
persons." 1 01 The court further reasoned that not allowing an indemnity action
would frustrate legislative intent while allowing the indemnity action would

or compromise, the public service commission of Nevada shall consider:
(a) The gravity of the violation;
(b)The good faith of the person charged with the violation in attempting to comply with
the provisions of [NRS] 455.200 to 455.240, inclusive, before and after notification of a violation; and
(c)Any history or previous violations of those provisions by the person charged with
the violation.
5. A civil penalty recovered pursuant to this section must first be paid to reimburse the
person who initiated the action for any cost incurred in prosecuting the matter. Any amount
remaining after such reimbursement must be deposited in the state general fund.
6. Any person aggrieved by a determination of the public service commission of Nevada pursuant to this section may seek judicial review of the determination in the manner
F6rovided by [NRS] 233B. 130 to 233B. 150, inclusive.
9 635 S.W.2d at 134-5 (emphasis added).
9 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 684 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982)
supra note 49.
98 635 S.W.2d at 134-5. The court noted "An indemnity action is derivative of the primary
suit for damages and a defendant has no right of indemnity or contribution against whom the
injured has no cause of action... Where, as in the instant case, an employee has contracted
away his right to sue his employer, and has accepted workers' compensation benefits, the
third party has no right of indemnity against the negligent employer."
99737 P.2d 1385 (Ariz.App. 1987).
1oo Id. It should be noted the court also held "the statute requiring a person conducting activity in the vicinity of high voltage overhead lines to indemnify the electric company with respect to resulting damages, including damages to third persons, is not unconstitutionally
vague or fundamentally unfair to the extent that it requires indemnity even where injury results in whole or part from utility's independent negligence." Id.
10 737 P.2d at 1388.
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harmonize the two statutory schemes. 102 In Tucson Elec. v. Dooley-Jones and
Assoc., 1 03 a surveyor who was injured when he came into contact with a high
voltage power line sued the power company and the power company filed a
third-party claim for indemnity against the surveyor's employer. The court
held workers' compensation remedies do not bar a power company's indemnification claim against an employer. 104 The court further noted the claim was
based solely on a statutory duty.
"When a claim for indemnity is based on a
statutory right, it 0is6 the statute that determines the effect of the indemnitee's
own negligence."'
The Haggerty court should not have noted Arizona authority, nor cited
Tucson v. Swengel-Robbins, because the Haggerty court did not define or
establish the contractual relationship from which an implied indemnity action
may arise in Nevada. Specifically, if implied indemnity can be allowed between an employer and power company under the overhead power line statutes,
the "door is open" for implied indemnity agreements between other public utility statutory schemes and employers or other implied indemnity agreements. In
that regard, the Haggerty court notes the Tucson v. Swengel-Robbins' decision
was based on legislative intent and "harmonized the two statutes." However,
the legislative intent reasoning is inapplicable in Nevada because there is virtually no legislative history on this subject and the legislature inserted a civil
remedies provision for the purpose of encouraging employers to promote
worker safety. 107 Further, allowing indemnification of public utilities does not
"harmonize the two statutes" in Nevada. As previously noted, it was not until
1990 demnty
in American Federal
Savings Bank that Nevada allowed even express in•108
demnity agreements.
Therefore, the concept of express indemnity agree102

Id. The court had previously noted "the indemnity provision of the high voltage power

line statutes represent a determination by the legislature that where work is being performed
near power lines, the person or entity performing the work is in the best position to prevent
injury-whether caused by its negligence or that of the utility-by giving notice so that appropriate protective measures may be taken." Id. at 1387.
103746 P.2d 510 (Ariz.App. 1987). The Arizona court mainly relies upon Tucson Elec. v.
Swengel-Robbins, 737 P.2d 1385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), and notes that in that case, "the
court made it clear that the legislature intended that utilities [in similar situations] can be indemnified even if they were also negligent." Id. at 512.
'04 746 P.2d at 511.
105Id. at 514. A.R.S. § 40-360.43 requires any person or business entity who desires to temporarily carry on any function, activity or work within six feet of a high voltage overhead
power line to promptly notify the utility operating the high voltage line before performing
the work. Failure to notify allows a utility to seek indemnity for "all damages to the facilities and all costs and expenses, including damages to third persons, incurred by the public
utility as a result of the contact.
106 746 P.2d at 514.
10 7 See text and accompanying note 88.
' 8NRS 616.265 forbid express indemnity contracts to modify or in any way alter the specifications of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. See text and accompanying note 45. See
also, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 684 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982),
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ments interfering with the rights and liabilities under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is a relatively new concept in Nevada law. The Court's holding in
Haggerty does not harmonize the overhead power lines statutes and exclusive
remedy provision but introduces a brand new concept to Nevada workers'
compensation law. Specifically, instead of harmonizing the two statutes, the
Haggerty Court potentially obliterates the exclusive remedy provision of the
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act by paving the way for any sort of implied indemnity agreement to constitute an exception to the exclusive remedy provision.
The Haggerty Court also mentioned Oklahoma's stance on the exclusive
remedy/implied indemnity a reement issue. In Traveler's Ins. Co. v. L. V.
French Truck Service, Inc.,
an employee of L.V. French Truck Service, Inc.,
was injured in the course and scope of his employment when, while transporting a drill across a country road, he came across a clearance insufficient for the
truck and attempted to raise the power line. The employee received workers'
compensation benefits, then sued Cimarron Electric Cooperative. Traveler's
Insurance Company, Cimarron's liability carrier, brought an indemnity claim
against French Truck Service to recover the loss it had paid. The court noted
that a third-party's right to indemnity must arise out of an independent legal relationship between the employer and the third-party.110 The court reasoned
"..although French's liability, as well as the loss paid by Travelers, arose out
of the same facts, the gravamen of Traveler's claim is enforcement of a statutorily created duty which is imposed without regard to whether any other kind of
obligation may result, from
i.e., responsibility to pay compensa, . the
. violation,
. . .
,,111
tion for an employee's on the job injury.
The Court also mentioned FlintElectric Membership v. Ed Smith Construction,l12 to support its holding that the overhead power line statutes and,
more specifically, NRS 455.240, constitute an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. In Flint, an employee
brought a negligence action against Flint Electric arising out of an electrical
shock he sustained while in the course and scope of his employment when a
crane came into contact with a high voltage power line. Flint Electric then
sought indemnity from Ed Smith Construction although the employee had received workers' compensation benefits from Ed Smith. The court held:
• . the better construction of these two statutes is to hold that the indemnity
provision of the HVSA (High Voltage Safety Act) may be enforced without
offending the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA (Worker's Compensation Act) by according indemnity actions pursuant to the HVSA the same digsupra note 49; American Federal Savings Bank v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d
1270 (1990).
109 770 P.2d 551 (Okl. 1988).
10

Id. at 554.

111Id.
112511 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. 1999).
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nity case law has given contractual indemnity provisions executed by private
parties. Thus, while the WCA remains an employee's sole remedy against an
employer on account of a work related injury, the HVSA authorizes a powerline company to obtain indemnification from an employee on account of the
employer's failure to abide by the safety provisions of the HVSA." 3
The only case the Hagerty court cites in opposition to its holding is
Rodriguez v. Nurseries, Inc.,' 14 in which an employee of the nursery and his
wife brought an action against the nursery seeking recovery in excess of workers' compensation benefits already received for an injury sustained in the
course and scope of his employment. The court held the High Voltage Safety
Act did not create an exception to the workers' compensation act's exclusivity
provision.1 15 This case is clearly distinguishable from Haggerty because in
Rodriguez, the injured employee sued his employer directly. In that regard, it is
surprising the Haggerty Court would even note Rodriguez since the Colorado
case does not even deal with issues surrounding indemnity/contribution. Nonetheless, Rodriguez still considers fundamental rules of statutory construction
which are important to the Nevada Supreme Court's analysis in Haggerty. In
that regard, the court noted there is a presumption all laws are passed with
knowledge of those already existing and the General Assembly does not intend
to repeal a statute without so declaring. 116 Specifically, as it pertains to the
immunity from suit of a complying employer, the workers' compensation act's
exclusivity has been continually reaffirmed and 17
if the General Assembly had
wanted to limit it, it would have done so clearly. 1
Although Rodriguez appears misplaced in the random cases the Haggerty
court mentions in its opinion, and the other cases can generally be distinguished
from Haggerty, the common thread linking the cases is the courts' analysis of
when an independent duty exists between an employer and third-party and why
an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation acts
will arise from that relationship. Indemnity is a contract by which one engages
to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties,
or of some other person.
Noncontractual or equitable indemnity is similar to
common law contribution; one who is only constructively or vicariously obligated to pay damages because of another's tortious conduct may recover the
113 511 S.E.2d at 162.
114

815 P.2d 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

115

Id.

116

Id. at 1008, citing City & County of Denver v. Rinker, 366 P.2d 548 (1961).

"' 815 P.2d at 1008. See also Popovich v. Irlando, 811 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1991).

See Travelers Ins. Co. v. French Truck Service, 770 P.2d 551, 556 (Okla. 1988); 15 O.S.
1981 § 421. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 772 (7th ed. 1999) which provides indemnity is (1) a duty to make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another; (2) the
right of an injured party to claim reimbursement for its loss, damage, or liability from a person who has such a duty; (3) Reimbursement or compensation for loss, damage, or liability
in tort, esp., the right of a party who is secondary liable to recover from the party who is
primarily liable for reimbursement or expenditures paid to a third party for injuries resulting
from a common law duty.
118
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sum paid from the tortfeasor. 119 In that regard, all of the courts mentioned in
Haggerty recognize a statutory or contractual duty from which the obligation to
indemnify will arise.
In Texas, only a party entitled to indemnification for damages to an injured
employee would be entitled to recover indemnity from an employer under the
Public Utilities Act. 12 In Arizona, a legal relationship between an employer
and third-party is created by statute establishing the distance requirements for
equipment and persons.
Similarly, in Oklahoma the basis of a third-party
indemnity action is the enforcement of a statutorily created duty. 122 In
23 Georgia, the indemnity action is based strictly on the legislative enactment. 1
Although the Majority in Haggerty acknowledges other jurisdictions'
holdings regarding the third-party implied indemnity issue in the public utility
context, the Court disregards the fact other jurisdictions defined and explained
the independent duty between an employer and third-party power companies. 124 In Haggerty, the Majority fails to define the independent duty under
which an implied indemnity agreement creates an exception to the exclusive
remedy provision of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. In that regard, the
Majority fails to explain why an independent duty exists between an employer
and third-party, or specifically an employer (Horseshoe) and Nevada Power
Company. Nonetheless, the Court still held an employer can be required to indemnify a power company despite employer immunity under the Nevada
Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision. 125 To reach such a con19See Traveler's at 556. See also Braden v. Hendricks, Oki., 695 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Oki.
1985); Porter v. Norton Stuart Pontiac-Cadillac of Enid, Oki., 405 P.2d 109, 113 (Oki.
1965); Burrell v. Rodgers, 441 F.Supp. 275, 278 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
120
See Houston Lighting, Etc. v. Eller Outdoor Adv., discussed supra. In that regard, one
needs to have some liability or be owed some damage and a relationship arises therefrom.
121See Tucson Elec. v. Swengel-Robbins Const., Tucson Elec. v. Dooley-Jones and Assoc.,
discussed supra. See also A.R.S. § 40-360-42 which provides unless danger against contact
with high voltage overhead lines has been effectively guarded against as provided by § 40360.43: (1) A person or business entity shall not, individually or through an agent or employee, require any other person to perform any function or activity upon any land, building,
highway, or other premises if at any time during the performance of any function or activity
it is possible that the person performing the function or activity could move or be placed
within six feet of any high voltage overhead line or if it is possible that any part of any tool
or material used by the person could be brought within six feet of any high voltage overhead
line during the performance of any function or activity.
122See Traveler's Ins. Co. v. L.V. French Truck Service, Inc., discussed supra Part IV.A.
123See Flint Electric Membership v. Ed Smith Construction, discussed supra Part IV.A.
124The Court cites Tucson Electric Power Company v. Swengel-Robbins, 737 P.2d 1385
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), and notes the Arizona court held that an employer can be required to
indemnify a power company despite employer immunity under workers' compensation law.
Id. at 1388. However, the Tucson court reasoned the [exclusive remedy] statute limits the
employer's options regarding employer liability, but does not limit the employer's liability
based on a legal relationship with a third party. Id. This relationship is created by the statute
establishing the distance requirements for equipment and persons. Id. Similarly, NRS
455.220 provides distance requirements for persons, tools, or materials working near high
voltage overhead power lines.
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dustrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision. 125 To reach such a conclusion requires explanation. Failing to define the independent legal duty
opens the door for Nevada courts to broadly interpret the independent duty doctrine in the future.
A broad interpretation of the independent duty doctrine could be fatal to
Nevada workers' compensation law's exclusive remedy provision. Employers
would be liable to third-parties whether or not a legal duty exists between them
because the independent duty as established in OutboardMarine has been expanded. Nullifying the exclusive remedy provision potentially exposes employers to double liability because they will now have to pay workers' compensation benefits to injured workers and possibly have to indemnify third-parties in
the same matter. Therefore, one of the major premises of workers' compensation law is nullified and the fundamental mutual benefit and policy underlying
workers' compensation is removed from the statutory scheme.
B.

Otherjurisdictionshave not allowed exceptions to exclusivity provisions of
workers' compensation acts.

Although the Majority cited cases from four jurisdictions in support of its
holding the overhead power line statutes constitute an exception to the Nevada
Industrial Insurance Act's exclusivity provision, the Majority overlooks the fact
other jurisdictions have not allowed exceptions to workers' compensation acts.
126
For example, in New Jersey, in Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries,
appellant was injured when, while moving a drum of solid waste on the premises of his employer, Laminating Corporation of America, he tripped over a rut
made by a solid waste hauler, Browning-Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc.
Appellant recovered workers' compensation benefits from Laminating Corporation and sued Browning-Ferris Industries, which in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Laminating Corporation. The New Jersey Supreme Court
held:
The New Jersey [Exclusivity] Rule is consistent with that of the great majority
of jurisdictions, which hold that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act precludes a claim for contribution against an employer
127
whose concurring negligence contributed to the injury of an employee.
In Ramos, the New Jersey Supreme Court found holding the third-party
tortfeasor solely responsible to the injured employee "may seem unfair. Indeed,
Professor Larson describes the issue of the effect of the exclusive-liability provision of the Worker's Compensation Act on the right of a third-party tortfeasor
125 989

P.2d at 877. The holding in Haggerty effectively overrules American FederalSav-

ings Bank, discussed supra, which established a duty created by an express indemnity contract must exist to indemnify a third party and escape the provisions of the Nevada Industrial
Insurance Act.
126 510 A.2d 1152 (N.J. 1986). The relevant New Jersey high voltage power lines
statutes
are
found at N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 34:6-47.5-47.7a (1991).
27
1 510 A.2d at 1156.
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to recover contribution or indemnification from an employer whose negligence
was a concurrent cause of the plaintiff-employee's injury as 'rperhaps the most
evenly balanced controversy in all of compensation law...' "29
Also in New Jersey, in Bradford v. Kupper Associates,129 an injured employee of a contractor and estate of a deceased employee of a contractor
brought a negligence action against a municipal utility and engineering firm
arising from the employee's exposure to hydrogen sulfide gas while repairing a
sewer. The court held:
Although a third-party tortfeasor cannot seek contribution from an employer, it may obtain indemnification where that course is specifically
permitted by way of an express contract. The [Workers Compensation]
Act does not preclude the employer's assumption of a contractual
duty to
30
indemnify a third-party through an express agreement.

In the leading case establishing the rule that when the relation between the
parties does not spring from contract or special position such as bailee or lessee, the third-party cannot recover indemnity from the employer, Judge
Learned Hand interpreted New Jersey law and gave the following reason for
the rule:
.. we shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee are both liable
to the injured person, it is the law of New Jersey that, regardless of any other
relation between them, the difference in gravity of their faults may be great
enough to throw the whole loss upon one. We cannot, however, agree that
that result is rationally possible except upon the assumption that both parties
are liable to the same person for the joint wrong. If so, when one of the two is
not so liable, the right of the other to indemnity must be found in rights
and li13
abilities arising out of some other legal transaction between the two. 1

In Carl T. Madsen, Inc., v. BablerBrothers, Inc., 132 a subcontractor (Madsen) brought a declaratory judgment action to absolve itself from liability under
an alleged agreement to indemnify a contractor (Babler), and the contractor
counterclaimed seeking indemnity from the subcontractor. The Washington
Court stated:
Although the Industrial Insurance Act 'immunizes' participating employers
from third-party claims arising out of negligent injury to their workers, our
Court has recognized a right of action where the employer has voluntarily assumed an independent duty or obligation to indemnify such a third-party (citations omitted). [S]o long as the claim of indemnity arises on account of a
separate obligation running from the employer to the third-party and not
merely because the employer's negligence caused the employee's injury,
an
33
action for indemnification is judicially cognizable (citations omitted). 1
128 Id. See also LARSON, supra note 1, at § 76.11.
129662 A.2d 1004 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).

130 662 A.2d at 1019. See also Port Authority of New York v. Honeywell Protective Services, 535 A.2d 974 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
131Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951).
132 610 P.2d 958 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
133610 P.2d at 960-1.
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Furthermore, the Washington Court added "although the independent duty
running to an employer and third-party cannot arise solely by implication (citafound in the contract,
tions omitted), where the independent duty is expressly
134
found."
be
may
indemnification
to
right
the implied
135
appellant was inIn a Utah case, Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
jured when he came in contact with an electrical power line as he was splicing
amplifiers into a television cable previously hung by Cablemain, Inc., on utility
poles owned by Utah Power & Light Co. Appellant worked for Jones Intercable, Inc., and recovered workers' compensation benefits from his employer.
Appellant then sued Cablemain and Utah Power & Light, who brought a thirdparty indemnity claim against Jones Intercable, Inc. The Utah Supreme Court
concluded "indemnity should be enforced only where the employer has expressly agreed to indemnify, thereby affirmatively waiving the immunity afforded him by the exclusive remedy provision ...[and] refused to allow indemnity against an employer based upon an implied agreement." 136 The court
reasoned:
If such an agreement to indemnify were to be implied, the employer would be
obligated to pay damages to an injured employee, through a third-party, over
and above the amount of compensation fixed by the Act, and thus imposed the
very liability against which the Act declared the employer should be insulated.
not, by
This does not appear to be the legislative intention and the Court will
37
decision, alter the plain, clear language of the legislative enactment.

The State of Oregon also recognizes employer indemnity under its workers' compensation laws. Specifically, Oregon has a statute that voids indemnity or other device that changes or waives any liability created. 138 In Roberts
v. Gray's Crane and Rigging, Inc., 139 Appellant's estate brought a wrongful
death action against an equipment lessor which had leased equipment to decedent's employer, a subcontractor on a construction project. The equipment lessor filed a third-party complaint against the general contractor seeking
contribution. The general contractor brought a fourth-party complaint against
the subcontractor for indemnity or contribution. The equipment lessor moved
to amend its third-party complaint to include a claim against the subcontractor
based on the indemnity provisions of the lease agreements. The Oregon court
held the indemnity agreement between the subcontractor and lessor was void
34

1

/d. at 961.

793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). The relevant Utah high voltage power line statutes are found
at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-8c-2 and 54-8c-4 (1988).
135

116Id. at 368.

137
793 P.2d at 368. See also LARSON at § 76.20, at 14-730 (1993); and Comment, The Effect
of Workers' Compensation Laws on the Rights of a Third Party Liable to an Injured Employee to Recover Contribution or Indemnity from the Employer, 9 SETON HALL L. REV.
238, 264 (1978).
138 See OR. REv. STAT. § 656.018 (1993). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 757.805 (1999) regarding work near high voltage power lines: "Accident prevention; required for work near high
voltage lines; effect of failure to comply; applicability; other remedies unaffected."
139 697 P.2d 985 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
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under a workers' compensation statute which provides that an employer's du
to provide coverage shall be its exclusive liability for injuries to its workers.I1
In interpreting OR. REV. STAT. § 656.078 (1993), the court reasoned "the legislature was concerned that third-party indemnity claims against employers
would circumvent
and undermine the exclusive liability provision" of workers'
• 141
compensation.
In Iddings v. Me-Lee, 4 2 a nurse brought a negligence action against a doctor to recover for injuries allegedly received in a workplace accident. The court
held that absent an express written contractual indemnification agreement between the indemnitor and the indemnitee, or another duty distinct from the duty
to provide the employee with a safe place to work, the indemnitee will not be
able to secure indemnity from the indemnitor for a judgment against him in a
suit by the employee, should the employee prevail.' 4
In a Montana case, Cordierv. Stetson-Ross, Inc.,
an employee of Champion International Corporation was injured in an industrial accident and received workers' compensation. The employee subsequently sued Stetson-Ross,
Inc., alleging negligence in connection with machinery Stetson-Ross, Inc., sold
to Champion. Stetson-Ross then filed a third-party complaint against Champion seeking indemnity for any damages it may have to pay to Champion's injured employee. Montana permitted a claim of indemnity against an employer
even though the injury occurred under the Worker's Compensation Act, because a written save harmless agreement existed between indemnitor and indemnitee. 45 The Montana Supreme146Court therefore saw the employer had a
separate obligation to the employee.
C. Haggerty is not consistent with public policy underlying the Nevada
IndustrialInsuranceAct's exclusive remedy provision.
In holding the overhead power line statutes constitute an exception to the
exclusive remedy provision of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, the Majority mentions the important public policy behind overhead power line statutes.
Specifically, the Majority states:
Many states have enacted high voltage safety acts designed to decrease the
number of injuries suffered by people, particularly workers, as a result of accidental contact with high voltage electrical equipment. These statutes require
140 /d.
141696 P.2d at 989.

142 919 P.2d 263 (Hawaii 1996).
141 Id. at 278.
144 604 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979). See also Lefoski v. Ravalli County Elec. Co.-Op., 439 P.2d
370 (Mont. 1968), in which the widow of an employee filed a wrongful death action against
her deceased husband's employer electric company. The court held that to indemnify a party
against his own negligence, the indemnity must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.
Id. at 371.
14'604 P.2d at 91.
146Id.
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persons to contact the local utility company before working near certain types
of high voltage electrical systems. The utility company can then ensure that
the work
is performed in a safe manner, without damage to persons or prop14 7
erty.

As the Majority notes, the Nevada High Voltage Overhead Power Line Act
was enacted ....
in 1993 for the purpose of protecting
workers who work in the vi148
cinity of high voltage overhead power lines.

The legislature was aware of

the importance of the act in promoting workers safety; it allows for penalties in
the event its provisions are violated.
Ironically, the Court still finds it necessary to allow an exception to exclusive remedy provisions, also to promote

worker safety. This exception is not only unnecessary, but ignores important
policies behind workers' compensation law in Nevada.
The fundamental policy in Nevada is to construe workers' compensation
statutes liberally for the protection of the worker. 150 Similarly, the public policy encompassing workers' compensation statutes dictates a broad interpretation of the exclusive remedy rule. 15 1 The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinctly
framed the policy considerations surrounding this issue writing "Worker's
compensation legislation was enacted to provide a substitute remedy to an em-

ployee for accidental injuries received during employment without the burden
of his proving negligence. In exchange for this exposure the employer is protected from any other liability to the employee. To be equitable as well as effective, this protection must extend to Iall] liability either directly or indirectly
derived from the employee's injuries."
Similarly, Nevada has always had a strong public policy to uphold the Ne-

147989

P.2d 873.
148
See, e.g., statement of Curtis Risley, Manager, Risk Management and Claims Department, Sierra Pacific Power Company: ". . .this style of law best protects the worker, and
gives the crane operator incentive to obey the law, thus avoiding injury;" and statement of
Donald Fabbi, Manager of Safety Services, Nevada Power Company: "the vast majority of
accidents he has investigated could have been avoided by this type of legislation." Discussion of S.B. 400 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 67th Legis. Sess. (Nev.
1993).
14 9 See NRS 455.240 supra note 45. See also statement of Keith Ashworth, testifying in
support of S.B. 400 in behalf of Nevada Power Company: "...if the utility was not notified
first and a problem occurred as a result of the activity, then the person who caused the damage would be held responsible... if a violation occurred, the person causing the violation
would be required to pay damages." Hearing in S.B. 400 Before the Assembly Comm. on
Health and Human Services, 67th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 1993).
150
See, e.g., SIIS v. Campbell, 109 Nev. 997, 1000, 862 P.2d 1184, 1185 (1993); Ransier v.
SIIS, 104 Nev. 742, 746, 766 P.2d 274, 276 (1988); Dep't Ind. Relations v. Circus Circus,
101 Nev. 405, 411-12, 705 P.2d 645, 649 (1985).
151
See, e.g., Smith v. Vestal, 494 N.W.2d 370, 375 (N.D. 1992). See generally Beam v.
Concord Hospitality, 873 F.Supp. 491 (Kan. 1994); Oliver v. Barrick Golstrike Mines, 111
Nev. 1338 (1995).
152See Harter Concrete Products, Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526, 528 (Okla. 1979).
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vada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provisions.15 3 This policy is
consistent with Nevada's policy of liberally construing workers' compensation
statutes for the protection of the worker.
In that regard, the pinnacle benefit
for an employer to contribute to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is the employer's immunity from third-party claims. Under the modem workers' compensation system the costs will ultimately be placed on the consumer; that is,
on the employers and employees. Specifically:
Workers' compensation is a mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and
medical care to victims of work- connected injuries, and for placing the cost of
these injuries ultimately on the consumer, through the medium of insurance,
whose premiums are passed on in the cost of the product.' 55
[The Workers] compensation system does not place the cost on the "public" as
such, but on a particular class of consumers, and thus retains a relation between the hazardousness of particular industries
and the cost of the system to
56
that industry and consumers of its product. 1

Nevada has incorporated this fundamental principal into the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. In that regard, for employers insured under the state insurance system, NRS 616B.206(7) provides "The manager shall adopt by regulation a plan for reviewing employers insured by the system who have excessive
losses.. .in order to encourage those employers to pay for their losses and correct their loss experience." Similarly, the law in Nevada provides:
A self-insured employer must, in addition to establishing financial ability to
pay, deposit with the commissioner a bond by the employer as principal, and
by a corporation qualified under the laws of this state as surety, payable to the
State of Nevada, and conditioned upon the payment of compensation for injuries and occupational diseases to employees. The bond must be in an amount
reasonably sufficient to ensure payment of compensation, but in no event may
it be less than 105 percent of the employer's expected annual incurred cost of
claims, or less then $100,000. In arriving at an amount for the expected annual cost of claims, due consideration must be given to the past and prospective experience of the employer with losses and expended within this state, to
the hazard of catastrophic loss, to other contingencies, and to trends within the
state. In arriving at the amount of the deposit required, the commissioner may
consider the nature of the employer's business, the financial ability of57the employer to pay compensation and his probable continuity of operation. 1

In effect, Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty "opens the door" for future ex153

See, e.g., Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 905 P.2d 168 (1995); Out-

board Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 93 Nev. 158, 561 P.2d 450 (1977); American Federal
Savings v. Washoe, 106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d 1270 (1990).
154 See text and accompanying note 145.
155 See LARSON, supranote 1,at § 1.00.
156 See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 1.04(2). Where experience rating, ie., the adjustment of
premium on the individual basis of past accident and liability record, is applied to individual
employers, this competitive impact is carried one step further, in that an individual employer
with a bad safety record might conceivably in time incur premiums so high that its cost of
production would not permit it to compete. LARSON, supra note 1, p.l -14.
.57 NRS 616B.300(2).
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ceptions to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision.
In that regard, if implied indemnity agreements can be allowed between an employer and power company under the overhead power line statutes, the door is
now open for implied indemnity agreements between other public utility statutory schemes and employers, and potentially any other implied indemnity
agreements. Forcing employers to indemnify third-parties under implied indemnity agreements means employers will beaying many more claims above
As a result, insurance compaand beyond those paid to injured employees.
nies who insure self-employed insurers and the Employers Insurance Company
of Nevada can potentially raise employer's insurance premiums for their workers compensation coverage as permitted by NRS 616B.206(7) and NRS
616B.300(2). Ultimately this cost will be passed on to the employee, possibly
if the legisthrough lower wages, or even lower workers'compensation..benefits
159
While wealthy
lature can be influenced by powerful, wealthy corporations.
corporations obviously disfavor implied indemnity agreements because of the
risk of higher insurance premiums, the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in
Haggerty is potentially fatal to small businesses. 16 Forcing small businesses
158Cf Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN L. REV. 405, 509 (1988), suggesting one possible
solution to subjecting employer's to outrageous indemnity exposure would be to shift the
loss from the third party to the employer up to the extent of the employer's workers' compensation liability. In that way, the employer's maximum exposure would be the equivalent
of losing the subrogation interest.
159 An injured worker is entitled to a statutorily fixed sum depending on the nature of the injury and the injured employee's incapacity. See, e.g., NRS 616C.490(6) and NRS 616C.440
supra note 18. See also, e.g., Commissioner J. Randolph Ward, Primary Issues In Compensation Litigation, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 443, 469 (1995), discussing the problem of rising
workers' compensation costs in North Carolina:
The anecdotal evidence suggests the rising cost of workers' compensation insurance has
been accompanied by an increase in the number of employers subject to the act going noninsured. Premiums actually billed employers increased an average of 144% from 1987
through 1993. . .a concurrent problem has been the underreporting of "all injuries"traditionally defined as one serious enough to require a physician's attention off the workplace premises... Reports of "medical only" claims have fallen by 60,000 in recent years,
presumably due to employers trying to avoid the adverse effect on the "experience modification"
formula that sets their premium rate according to risk.
160 See, e.g., Mark C. Zebrowski, Indemnity Clauses and Workers' Compensation: A Proposal for Preserving the Employer's Limited Liability, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1421 (1982). Mr.
Zebrowski similarly contends that in the contractor-subcontractor context, forcing a subcontractor to insure against a risk does not obviate the need for insurance against the same risk
by the general contractor or owner. Thus, several parties have to purchase insurance for the
same underlying risk. The increased insurance burden thwarts the incentive structure of the
tort system. For example, if the general contractor is continually able to contract out responsibility for its own negligence, neither its insurance costs not its profits will reflect a poor
safety record, and it will have little incentive to increase workers safety. On the other hand,
the subcontractor will repeatedly be exposed to liability, at least in part for the negligence of
others. These higher costs may reduce its capacity for competitive bidding and thus diminish its ability to compete in the market. Id. at 1428-29. As evidence of the problem of spiraling workers' compensation costs, since 1990, according to the National Foundation for
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to pay claims for implied indemnity agreements
may make workers' compensa16 1

tion insurance premiums unmanageable.
With the "door now open" in Nevada for implied indemnity agreements to
constitute an exception to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusivity
provision, the previously settled "most evenly balanced controversy" Professor
Larson refers to is now potentially a controversy in Nevada. 162 Specifically,
third-parties sued by injured employees may be more likely to pursue employers in indemnity/contribution claims. Therefore, attorneys in Nevada will embrace Haggerty and the extensive legal battles which may result. This gives
attorneys less incentive to fight for employees' safety or even to expediently
settle workers' compensation claims. For example, if attorneys and courts are
aware third-parties will be able to recover some of their losses from negligent
employers, they may be less likely to••quickly settle
claims in injured workers
163
best interest and more likely to litigate matters.
The injured employee who
may be dependent upon workers' compensation benefits will suffer as a result
of not obtaining an expedient settlement. Specifically, the Nevada Supreme
Court's holding in Haggerty potentially nullifies the exclusive remedy provision of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act and reeks havoc on the workers'
1 64
compensation system which was created for the protection of the worker.
Employment Compensation and Workers' Compensation (3/31/95), over twenty-five states
have enacted major reform bills aimed at bring down spiraling workers' compensation costs.
161 See text and accompanying note 151.
162But see Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation,96
HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1654 (1983):

"[J]udicial reluctance to adopt exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule has stemmed from an unwillingness to tamper with what courts see as the
fixed terms of the carefully designed legislative bargain underlying workers' compensation.
Courts taking this view regard the exclusive remedy rule as a reluctantly conceded bargaining chip essential to the original deal and, in turn, to the preservation of the compensation
system. Such courts perceive constraints on their authority to modify the bargain and they
therefore defer to legislatures for the enactment of any needed reform."
163See Lester Brickman, On the Reference of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort
Systems Outcomes are PrincipallyDetermined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1755, 1769-70 (1994): "The incentive for lawyers to press personal injury tort
claims is the return they earn for their efforts. As hourly rates of return have increased, more
claims have been brought, resulting in expansion of the scope of liability of those assessable
as liable for harm infliction." This statement is analogous to lawyers' incentives to pursue
third party indemnity claims, although ultimately not in injured workers' best interests. Additionally, Mr. Brickman notes that contingent fees usually recovered from personal injury
cases [and workers' compensation cases] are extremely lucrative as evidenced by the fact
contingent fee lawyers generally refuse to disclose their hourly rates of return while also refusing to enter into hourly rate contracts. Id.
164 E.g., in the maritime area, where workers are protected by the Federal Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), Congress has reduced similar indemnification problems. Most important, Congress enacted section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, which absolutely limits the employer's liability to the imposed by the compensation statute by prohibiting any
claim for indemnity from the employer. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4704; 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). In abol-
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D. The Nevada Supreme Court's Statutory Interpretationin Haggerty is
inconsistent with public policy in Nevada
Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court bases its decision in Haggerty on
rules of statutory interpretation. NRS 455.200(2) provides: "Overhead lines"
means a bare or insulated electrical conductor installed above ground." Specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court in Haggerty noted the most consistent
definition of this statute was "outdoor, electrical equipment."165 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, the provisions of the overhead power statutes do not apply to
high voltage electrical equipment located within a building, and Nevada Power
Company is not entitled to indemnification from the Horseshoe because the accident surrounding this claim occurred when an employee of the Horseshoe
came into contact with an exposed electrically charged copper wire in the
basement of the casino. 166 In that regard, the Court probably should never have
addressed the exclusive remedy issue as its reasoning was irrelevant to its ultimate determination. Additionally, its application of the rules of statutory construction is also confusing. Generally:
Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task
will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment; evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing canons
of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests
that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of
the enacting legislature, courts also often examine subsequent legal develop67
ments and the overall legal terrain in rendering an interpretation.'

At the onset, the Court defining "overhead power lines" to mean outdoor
electrical equipment is not inconsistent with general rules of statutory interpretation. In that regard, the Court's reasoning in its definition is applicable even
if the Court had found "overhead power lines" also referred to indoor electrical
equipment.
Specifically, the Majority feared including indoor electrical
equipment would require employers to contact Nevada Power any time they
ishing such indemnity claims, Congress reasoned that "unless such hold-harmless, indemnity
or contribution agreements are prohibited as a matter of public policy, vessels by their superior economic strength could circumvent and nullify the provisions of Section 5 of the Act
[establishing the statutory benefits as absolute and maximum liability for employers] by requiring indemnification from a covered employer for employee injuries." H.R. REP. No.
1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 7, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4704.
But see Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of the Workers' Compensation
Statutes, HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1660 (1983), which sets forth "using exceptions to eradicate
the exclusive remedy rule altogether would extend them beyond their individual justifications and would effectively redesign the workers' compensation itself. Notwithstanding
these caveats, however, the adoption of suitably confined exceptions to the exclusive remedy
rule remains a desirable and legitimate use of judicial authority."
65 989 P.2d at 878.
166

Id. at 879-80.

167 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation,Inertial Burdens, and
a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 583, 589 (1991).
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entered an electrical vault room and Nevada Power could charge a fee each
time to supervise the work. Therefore, Nevada Power would have no incentive
to maintain safety measures to protect workers safety. 168 However, NRS
455.230, which allows Nevada Power Co. to charge the supervisory fees, could
be just as easily abused when referring to employees that work outside with
outdoor power lines. In light of this fact, it is confusing why the Court interprets NRS 455.200(2) to mean only outdoor electrical equipment.
The Majority correctly notes the legislative history of the overhead power
line statutes does not resolve this issue because there is no mention of an exception to the workers' compensation immunity provisions in the record of the
hearings. 169 As previously noted, the basic policy in Nevada is to construe
workers' compensation statutes liberally for the workers' protection.17 0 The
general rule of liberal construction of workers' compensation statutes does not
justify the exclusion of a substantive right that cannot be supported by any fair
reading of the statutory scheme. 17 1 Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, such that the legislative intent is clear, a court should not 'add to
or alter [the language] to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the statute or
apparent from permissible extrinsic aids such as legislative history or committee reports. 172
Initially, there is no reason to interpret the overhead power line statutes
broadly for the protection of the workers because doing so ultimately does not
protect the worker. The primary benefit for an employer to contribute to the
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is the employer's immunity from third-party
claims. Broadly interpreting the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusivity
provisions to allow exceptions does not protect workers because ultimately the
employer's costs of paying additional claims will be placed on the employee.17 3 Conversely, Nevada has always had a strong public policy inluPholding the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision.
168989 P.2d at 879.
169See also Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1656 (1983) providing "Because the [exclusive remedy] exceptions
are an outgrowth of circumstances prevalent only within the current structure of the tort sys-

tem and the workplace, rules to govern these situations could not have been contemplated by
the designers of the statutory schemes. Hypothesized original intent should therefore not
constrain judicial decisionmaking about the exceptions."
170
See SIIS v. Campbell, 109 Nev. 997, 1000, 862 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1993); Ransier v. SIIS,
104 Nev. 742, 746, 766 P.2d 274, 276 (1988); Dep't of Ind. Relations v. Circus Circus, 101
Nev. 405, 411-12, 705 P.2d 645, 649 (1985).
171See SIIS v. Campbell, 109 Nev. 997, 1000, 862 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1993); Weaver v. SIIS,
104
Nev. 305, 306, 756 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1988).
172 See SIIS v. Bokelman, 113 Nev. 1116, 1122, 946 P.2d 179, 183 (1997); Breen v. Ceasar's
Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 82, 715 P.2d 1070, 1072 (1986).

173
See text and accompanying note 154.
e.g., Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 905 P.2d 168 (1995); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 93 Nev. 158, 561 P.2d 450 (1997); American Federal
Savings v. Washoe, 106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d 1270 (1990).
174 See,
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The Majority bases its holding on the conclusion that the overhead power
line statutes are more specific and therefore take precedence over the more
175
general exclusive remedy provision in the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act.
NRS 455.240 specifically provides for persons violating the High Voltage
Safety Act to pay costs, expenses and/or damages to the public utility. While
this provision is more specific than NRS 616B.612, which provides generally
for employer immunity, finding NRS 455.240(3) takes precedence over NRS
616B.612 is inconsistent with Nevada's fundamental policy of protecting
workers. Nevada Power Company is a huge, multi-million dollar corporation
which probably does not need the legislature's protection. Yet Nevada Power
already has the legislature's protection as evidence by NRS 455.240.176 The
Court's holding in Haggerty should therefore prompt the legislature to redraft
NRS 455.240(3) so that he political and judicial system in Nevada does not appear to be so impartial to the multi-million dollar power company. For example, something similar to the Colorado Safety Act would be more consistent
with the Nevada High Voltage Safety Act and more harmonious with the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provisions. The Colorado
Act reads:
A person or entity that violates the [Safety] Act:
may be liable for all damages and all costs and expenses, incurred, as a result
of the contact, as determined by a court of record, or by settlement made by all
parties who may become liable for such damages prior to the filing of or during the course of a civil action.' 77

CONCLUSION

The notion that workers' compensation benefits are the workers' exclusive
remedy against an employer following a work related accident is the mainstay
of workers' compensation law.178 Prior to Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, it
was well established in Nevada that an employer is only liable in a third-party
indemnity action when an9 express indemnity contract exists between an em17
ployer and a third-party.
Although Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty is the first case in Nevada to allow indemnity absent an express indemnity agreement, the Nevada Supreme
Court does not define the implied contractual agreement between Nevada
Power Co. and Haggerty but instead simply lists cases and bases its holding on
rules of statutory construction. This decision will have an important impact on
workers' compensation law. In that regard, the Court in Haggerty does not
"' 989 P.2d at 877.
176 See text and accompanying note 52.
177 COLO.

178See

REV.

STAT.

§ 9-2.5-104(2) (1986).

Bassin, supra note 1, at 843. See also LARSON, supra note 1, at § 65.
179 See generally American Federal Saving Bank v. Washoe County, 106 Nev. 869, 802 P.2d
1270 (1990).
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harmonize the overhead power line statutes and exclusive remedy provision but
introduces a brand new concept into Nevada law. The Nevada Supreme Court
has ignored fundamental principles of workers' compensation law while potentially obliterating the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act's exclusive remedy provision.

